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Abstract and Introduction 
The integrity of price-related financial benchmarks such as the London Inter-bank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the foreign exchange London WM Reuters 4pm ‘fix’ has suffered in the wake of 
revelations of manipulative activity carried out by individuals in financial institutions. A regulatory 
regime has since 2013 been introduced in the UK to oversee LIBOR, and more comprehensive 
thinking has been developing in relation to regulating financial benchmarks in general.1 This article 
argues that the regulation of financial benchmarks is very much caught between the desire on 
policy-makers’ part to preserve market stability, and yet maintain the nature of the financial 
benchmark as a market good. 
In the immediate aftermath of benchmark manipulation revelations,  it is clear that regulatory 
response is needed. However, as will be discussed, policy-makers wished to avoid excessive 
intervention that would ‘publicise’ important benchmarks, and yet create a regulatory regime that 
would assure of the credibility of financial benchmarks that are produced by the private sector. The 
ultimate approach taken in the UK legislation is premised upon preserving hitherto trusted 
benchmarks by allowing them to become ‘proprietised’. These premises also underlie the 
international framework developed by IOSCO and the European approaches.  
The ‘proprietisation’ approach essentially allows designated entities to have exclusive rights to 
develop and exploit the financial benchmark in return for protecting its quality. This is a market-
based approach which preserves hitherto important financial benchmarks, but such preservation is 
achieved at the price of destroying the original characteristics of the benchmarks. The article fleshes 
out the features of the UK, EU and IOSCO regulatory regimes that reflect the proprietisation 
approach and critically engages in its benefits and drawbacks. We argue that the proprietisation 
approach, heavily underscored by regulatory subsidy, neither delivers optimal characteristics of 
market-based governance nor effectively addresses key regulatory objectives. We offer some 
suggestions as to adjustments to the current regulatory frameworks. 
1. Developing the Regulation of Price-related Financial Benchmarks 
Price-related Financial Benchmarks 
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Financial benchmarks are widely used in determining the price of many financial contracts. For 
example, an interest rate benchmark serves the purpose of sign-posting the cost of credit at any one 
time. An interest rate benchmark like the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) provides a basis 
for the calculation of the price of debt over a period of time. As debt contracts need to mature, 
whether in the short term or longer term, parties to such a contract who have to agree on the price 
of debt at the outset are unable to fix the price where the value of a currency inherently fluctuates 
according to changes in interest rate.  Benchmarking the price of a debt contract allows for limited 
flexibility and the best-possible certainty in determining price in an incomplete contracting situation. 
The benchmark device thus saves on future transaction costs in terms of research and negotiation 
costs over the period of the contract. It acts as a facilitator for trust and access to such transactions, 
and serves the wider economic objective of democratising access to credit.2 Financial benchmarks 
that play such a crucial role in contractual price formation are hereinafter referred to as ‘price-
related financial benchmarks’. 
The LIBOR was first developed in the 1980s3 to facilitate the syndicated loans market, which allowed 
groups of banks together to fund large corporate borrowings and to share risks. In order to arrive at 
a price of debt that would be agreeable to all in the most cost-effective manner, the use of an 
interest rate benchmark to price the loan over the term seemed most efficacious and sensible. 
LIBOR has been generated by banks in the syndicated loans market, but the adoption of LIBOR has 
been extended to price a range of wholesale financial instruments such as futures, options and 
swaps, and also longer term products such as loans, savings and mortgages. Other financial 
benchmarks that serve the purpose of price discovery and the reduction of transaction costs are 
found in contracts that involve currency exchanges, e.g. the WM Reuters 4pm fix for foreign 
exchange; and commodities whose prices are subject to regular fluctuations in market discovery, e.g. 
the London gold fix and LBMA silver fix, and the ICE Brent futures for crude oil.4 These are largely 
used in the wholesale sector. 
Price-related financial benchmarks have become important collective goods generated by financial 
sector institutions to meet the needs of financial intermediation. They are privately produced goods 
albeit serving the collective purpose of the financial markets, and have hitherto been in the realm of 
‘private ordering’5 or self-regulation. As the integrity of a number of price-related benchmarks has 
been recently undermined, this calls into question the weaknesses of the self-regulatory nature of 
such privately produced collective goods. 
From Self-Regulation to Regulation 
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The London Interbank Offered Rate6 (LIBOR) and the London foreign exchange ‘4 pm fix’7 scandals 
have revealed the weaknesses of the private ordering system for price-related financial benchmarks. 
As price-related benchmarks are a collective good, many financial sector participants play a part in 
the production of the benchmark, by making submissions, quotes or producing transaction data. The 
inputs may be made with self-interest in mind, or may even be manipulative in nature. Although 
there may be a centralised body that aggregates the inputs (for example the British Bankers’ 
Association in relation to LIBOR up to 2014), such a body can be largely administrative in nature and 
does not police the substantive quality of the benchmark. Hence there may not be any incentives for 
financial sector participants or benchmark aggregating bodies to be dedicated to the collective 
maintenance of benchmark quality. The revelations that large global banks such as Barclays,8 UBS9 
and JP Morgan10 have been engaged in manipulative conduct relating to LIBOR, the WMR London fix 
for foreign exchange trading and the London gold fix have raised concerns globally as to the 
inadequacy of self-regulation.11  
In response to the LIBOR scandal, the UK instituted the Wheatley Review which recommended in 
September 2012 that a regulatory regime should be established for LIBOR.12 This became a leading 
template for international study, and was arguably influential in the issue of non-binding Guidelines 
by the European Banking Authority/European Securities and Markets Authority in June 201313 and in 
the introduction of the Principles for Financial Benchmarks by the International Organization of 
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Securities Commissions (OICU-IOSCO)  in July 201314 following a 3 month consultation from April 
2013. The UK has continued to developed more comprehensive thinking about regulating non-
securities markets in the fixed income, currencies and commodities sectors (FICC) including the use 
of financial benchmarks in those sectors. The Fair and Effective Markets Review was established by 
the UK Chancellor in June 2014, to conduct a comprehensive and forward-looking assessment of the 
way wholesale non-equities markets operate,15 including a review of financial benchmarks that are 
UK-based, of significant importance to the financial markets and relating to which serious 
misconduct concerns have arisen. The Review recommended in an interim report in 2014 that the 
LIBOR regime established in 2013 should be extended to seven other widely used benchmarks in UK 
markets. 16 In the final report of the Review published in June 2015,17 the Review made further 
recommendations that would strengthen the integrity of the FICC markets and financial sector 
trading culture generally. The Financial Stability Board (FSB)18 monitors the outworking of 
benchmark governance regimes. Further, the EU has now finalised legislation19 on financial 
benchmarks generally, in the form of a Regulation that is applicable to all Member States without 
national transposition.  
This article argues that the new regulatory frameworks have adopted an approach that ‘proprietises’ 
the financial benchmarks within their scope. This is a market-based approach which avoids excessive 
regulatory control (perhaps to prevent moral hazard and the drawbacks of publicising financial 
benchmarks, as will be discussed below) yet is driven by the public interest needs of maintaining 
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market stability. Section 2 will set in context the key drivers for the ‘proprietisation’ approach. 
Section 3 explains how this approach has shaped the key features of the IOSCO, UK and EU 
regulatory regimes. Although the EU regime will supercede the UK regulatory framework once it 
comes into force, it is still useful to examine the pioneering framework that the UK developed which 
provided the fundamental leadership in adopting the ‘proprietisation’ approach.  Section 4 critically 
draws out the implications of this approach and argues that its weaknesses have been recognised, 
such as by the FSB. However, there are a number of difficulties in overcoming these weaknesses, 
such as via the approach of developing alternative benchmarks. Section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Theoretical and Policy Context to the ‘Proprietisation’ of Price-related Financial 
Benchmarks  
The pioneering regulatory framework in the UK has adopted a market-based approach to regulating 
financial benchmarks. This is consistent with the subsequent IOSCO regime and the new EU 
regulatory regime. Designated private sector institutions are now responsible for producing and 
maintaining the benchmarks, an approach termed in this article as ‘proprietisation’, subject to 
regulatory obligations and accountability. Regulatory compliance by these institutions act as a proxy 
signal of benchmark credibility for financial markets, so market confidence in the relevant 
benchmarks can be maintained.  
The Proprietisation Approach 
The key attributes of the proprietisation approach are essentially: designating ‘ownership’ of the 
benchmark in order to incentivise quality maintenance; imposing a regime of governance for such 
‘owners’ as the ‘owners’ can now be identified and regulated; and designating specific 
responsibilities for such owners in return for the enjoyment of their ownership rights conferred by 
regulation.  Such a regime is akin to the conferment of exclusive exploitation rights over intellectual 
property, except in this case, the generation of the ‘intellectual content’ in financial benchmarks 
may not clearly be attributed to the designated owners. Price-related financial benchmarks are often 
generated out of an aggregate of information, whether based on trade data or notional submissions. 
Hence, the boundaries between public and private may seem blurred for such a collectively 
produced good that is capable of benefitting the market generally. We argue that policy-makers 
seemed averse to traversing into the ‘public’ side of the boundary in becoming responsible for 
administering price-related financial benchmarks that have become widely-used and important. 
Hence, a deliberate decision was taken in UK regulatory policy to frame the price-related financial 
benchmark as a private good and to strengthen its private good characteristics, although the raison 
d’etre of governing such goods lies in public interest. This incomplete characterisation, which is the 
cornerstone of the proprietisation approach, accounts for much of the weaknesses in the regulatory 
regimes discussed in this article. As Section 4 will flesh out, the ‘market-based’ proprietisation 
approach is unlikely to achieve optimal forms of market-based governance such as competitive 
efficiencies and market discipline, as it is heavily underscored by regulatory subsidy and distortion. 
On the other hand, the extent of regulatory governance is restrained in deference to the market-
based proprietisation approach. This results in an inadequate balance of regulatory governance to 
address key public interest needs such as long-term market and systemic stability. 
This Section now turns to the theoretical perspective of the price-related financial benchmark 
offered by Rauterberg and Verstein which very much accords with the proprietisation approach 
adopted in regulation. We will point out the weaknesses in the theoretical framework, which can 
now be discerned in the current regulatory frameworks discussed in Section 3. Nevertheless, the 
‘proprietisation’ approach meets the needs of certain policy drivers, which will also be discussed 
below. 
Theoretical Perspective of the Price-related Financial Benchmark  
The price-related financial benchmark has been described by Rauterberg and Verstein20 as a ‘by-
product index’. They argue that the ‘by-product’ nature of such benchmarks make them especially 
susceptible to damage.  
Rauterberg and Verstein21 are of the view that price-related benchmarks are not developed as end 
products in themselves, but as mechanisms to facilitate financial contracting. Thus, no one is 
incentivised to dedicate resources to the protection of by-product quality. In fact, perverse 
incentives may be at play, manipulating such by-products as long as the end result desired by the 
manipulators are met. 
The authors suggest that the quality of ‘by-product’ indices can only be improved if by-producers are 
allowed to become producers, having stronger intellectual property and proprietary rights over 
these indices so that they can profit out of index production. Turning price-related benchmark 
production into a commercial activity would incentivise the ‘producers’ to protect the ‘brand’ 
associated with these benchmarks. In this way, those interested in the commercial viability of the 
benchmark would take ownership of its quality and institute due governance for it.22 This article 
terms the above approach as the ‘proprietisation’ of financial benchmarks. The governance of such 
benchmarks is premised upon the conferment of exclusive proprietary rights over them to 
designated private sector entities. 
The regulatory frameworks in the UK, IOSCO and EU have to a large extent adopted this approach of 
incentive regulation by proprietisation. Section 3 fleshes out the regulatory attributes reflecting the 
proprietisation approach. Before we turn to those, this article suggests that the perspective taken by 
Rauterberg and Verstein, which emphasises incentives for producers of the benchmark, should be 
adopted with caution. This is because the perspective neglects the users of the benchmarks, which 
are the subjects intended for regulatory protection. 
By-product indices are rather special market goods as they are not only consumed by users who are 
in a bilateral contractual relationship with the producer of the good.  As by-product indices are 
developed for the purposes of facilitating financial transactions, they have been made freely 
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available and are not restricted in use and redistribution. For example, where LIBOR is concerned, 
although the development of the benchmark was for the purpose of providing the necessary 
mechanism for banks in a syndicated loan group to enter into such transactions in a cost-effective 
manner, the producers have no incentive to restrict use and indeed every incentive to promote use 
as the benchmark device could then be used to overcome transaction costs in other syndicated loan 
transactions, credit and structured credit transactions, derivative transactions and so on. Financial 
institutions are incentivised to freely distribute the interest rate benchmark in order to promote the 
growth of transactional markets based on this transaction-cost effective device. Consumers 
generally benefited from this as access to financial transactions may be made easier and at lower 
cost of price discovery. The ‘free-riders’ of by-product indices are an important group of 
stakeholders in these benchmarks. Their adoption and use of a financial benchmark adds value to 
the benchmark by collective affirmation, strengthening a benchmark’s appeal and leadership. This is 
beneficial to the benchmark producers in creating a positive feedback loop effect that reinforces the 
credibility of the benchmark. Hence, financial institutions have no incentive to limit free access and 
redistribution of such benchmarks and it is arguable that the very nature of by-product indices is 
characterised by such free access to them.  
A regulatory approach that seeks to proprietise financial benchmarks would fundamentally change 
the nature of these by-product indices and the relationship between these benchmarks and their 
user base. Although regulators believe that the proprietisation approach will introduce incentives for 
the benchmark producer to protect benchmark quality, hence benefitting users, the benefit of free 
access to this transaction-cost reducing mechanism may be compromised. Although the EU 
Regulation explicitly states that access to the benchmark should be provided based on transparent 
and non-discriminatory criteria, access is no longer free.23 This is not necessarily an approach that is 
wrong. However, it is important to point out this particular tradeoff, which will be discussed in detail 
in Section 4, in considering the objectives of introducing regulation. We now turn to the policy 
drivers supporting the proprietisation approach. 
Policy Drivers for the Proprietisation Approach  
The Wheatley Review that was commissioned to look into LIBOR reform after the manipulation 
scandals emerged considered many possibilities in regulating LIBOR, including the possibility 
replacing LIBOR with a new regulated benchmark. It ultimately concluded in favour of 
comprehensively reforming LIBOR. The Review was convinced by representations to the effect that 
LIBOR was not severely damaged to the extent that needed replacement, and that it would be highly 
disruptive to the market, if a forced change from LIBOR were to occur.24  
From the perspective of market participants, preserving the incumbent financial benchmark that is 
already widely used is important for market stability. But as the incumbent benchmark is damaged 
by market manipulation, there is a need for regulation to play a part in restoring the credibility of 
the benchmark. The market stability agenda requires a proportionate but not revolutionary 
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response.25 Hence, reforming LIBOR was designed to secure the effect of preserving and 
strengthening the existing benchmark. In this respect, the ‘proprietisation’ approach arguably meets 
the objectives in reforming LIBOR. The proprietisation of a financial benchmark ensures its 
preservation, as a private sector entity is incentivised by commercial motivations to protect that 
benchmark in order to exploit it. The private sector entity is made subject to regulation in return for 
its right of commercial exploitation. Thus, the existence of regulation underscores the credibility of 
the benchmark and supports market confidence in it. The proprietisation approach arguably 
achieves congruence with the immediate market stability needs identified by policy-makers. 
However, it could equally be argued that market stability needs are achieved by making LIBOR a 
public good instead of allowing private sector entities to assume proprietary rights over it. Self-
regulation has failed in respect of LIBOR, and would not regulatory intervention be appropriate to 
address the failure of such private ordering?26 
Regulators have the option of turning LIBOR into a public good,27 and this would preserve the 
commons nature of the good. Such an option brings about the chief advantage that the benchmark 
continues to be an easily accessible transaction-cost reduction mechanism that would help promote 
access to markets, a socially useful and fair objective. However, public administration of what first 
began as a market good may not always be appropriate and may bring about unintended 
consequences. There would no longer be a market for benchmarks, but one could argue that this 
same consequence entails too if the proprietisation approach is taken. Benchmark proprietisation 
could allow certain benchmark administrators to entrench incumbent benchmarks and distort 
competition in the market for benchmarks. Nevertheless and perhaps more importantly, the dis-
association of a market-based financial benchmark from free markets would create adverse 
impressions surrounding the benchmark. Kreicher et al28 argue that users have long favoured private 
sector produced benchmarks over government ones as the latter are prone to instability when policy 
changes or macro-economic or political shocks occur. Rebranding a damaged benchmark as a public 
good would likely be looked upon disfavourably in markets as global market participants would be 
concerned about whether domestic policy and political interests would interfere with the integrity of 
the benchmark. Hence, turning LIBOR into a public good may in fact be counterproductive to 
achieving the preservation of LIBOR and the restoration of market confidence surrounding the 
benchmark. 
The question whether regulation should preserve existing benchmarks or replace benchmarks is not 
addressed in the subsequent IOSCO and European Regulation. It seems taken for granted that the 
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regulatory framework is for existing benchmarks for the purposes of safeguarding market stability. 
Where the EU is concerned, harmonising the regulatory framework for financial benchmarks also 
reduces the likelihood that Member States will introduce diverse regulatory regimes that adversely 
affect the integration of EU financial markets. Further, the EU Regulation29 limits the adoption of 
financial benchmarks administered by foreign benchmark administrators unless given the 
recognition of equivalence. Such equivalence recognition can be given based on ESMA’s assessment 
of the equivalence of foreign regulatory frameworks supporting the credibility of such benchmarks. 
The Regulation is thus a market protection measure for EU-administered benchmarks and compels 
foreign benchmarks to meet equivalent standards. 
The article also suggests that the proprietisation approach could appeal to national regulators in the 
interest of protecting the attractiveness of their markets in global competition. National financial 
markets can become deeper and more attractive if the use of financial benchmarks tied to these 
national markets is widespread even at the international level. The UK’s interest in preserving the 
integrity of certain financial benchmarks in connection with LIBOR, the London fix for foreign 
exchange or the London gold fix is tied to its interest in maintaining a dominant position for 
transactions based on these benchmarks that come to London markets.30  
3. Unpacking the Proprietisation Approach Regulating Price-related Financial Benchmarks 
The UK, EU and IOSCO have established regulatory frameworks that treat financial benchmarks as 
market-based goods whose protection is seen to be strengthened by increasing designated private 
sector institutions’ proprietary rights over them. These institutions are however subject to an 
elaborate regime of compliance and accountability for the privilege of commercialising these 
benchmarks.  
The proprietisation approach in financial benchmark regulation is reflected in the following key 
features: 
(a) designating specific entities as exclusive holders of rights over financial benchmark 
production and distribution; 
(b) subjecting such entities to regulation in order to secure due governance over them; 
(c) designating responsibilities for such entities to ensure that benchmark production is 
credible; and 
(d) designating responsibilities for such entities to manage the benchmark including its 
attrition. 
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The following explains how the proprietisation approach is reflected in the key pillars of financial 
benchmark regulation in the UK, EU and IOSCO regimes. 
(a) Designating Benchmark Administrators as having Proprietary Rights over Financial Benchmarks 
First, the regulation of financial benchmarks under the UK framework, IOSCO’s standards and 
European Regulation31 commonly embrace the approach of allowing ‘benchmark administrators’ to 
be appointed by regulators in respect of individual benchmarks. 32 Such benchmark administrators 
have exclusive rights over the production and distribution of the financial benchmark/s under their 
purview. In the wake of the LIBOR scandal, the then voluntary administrator, the British Bankers’ 
association surrendered its administration rights so that such rights can be put to tender. The ICE 
(Inter-Continental Exchanges) has successfully gained administration rights for LIBOR. In addition, 
the ICE is also administrator for the ISDAFIX and the LBMA Goldfix. The free distribution of LIBOR has 
now been replaced by a licensing scheme introduced by the ICE.33 
The proprietisation approach has fundamentally changed or arguably destroyed the original 
character of price-related financial benchmarks as a collective good enjoyed by the market generally. 
However, it may be argued that regulation is not responsible for destroying the ‘commons’ nature of 
such by-product indices- individual deviant and abusive behaviour in the market is the culprit. 
Regulation may be regarded as having done ‘the next best thing’ by preserving the benchmark for 
the continuity of use in markets, but users would have to adapt to changes introduced as a result of 
benchmark proprietisation by the administrator. Section 4 explores this tradeoff in detail. 
 (b) Regulating Benchmark Administrators 
In return for the rights of commercial exploitation of financial benchmarks, benchmark 
administrators are now subject to regulatory oversight in terms of their internal governance. Good 
internal governance often serves as a proxy for sound outcomes.34  
Under the IOSCO and European approaches, benchmark administrators are required to establish 
effective internal control mechanisms, record-keeping and conflict of interest management 
policies,35 and ensure that they appropriate supervise their outsourcees.36 The UK framework is less 
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specific on organisational requirements but requires the administrator to be effectively governed.37 
The UK framework emphasises the need for robust irregularity detection mechanisms in the 
organisational framework of benchmark administrators, including whistle-blowing.38   
Further, all three regimes require that benchmark administrators institute oversight committees at 
Board level39 to scrutinise benchmark administration processes, production methodology and 
benchmark quality.  Oversight committees in UK benchmark administrators  comprise of external 
and independent persons, such as representatives of market infrastructure providers and users. The 
administrator must also appoint a number of independent non-executive directors to the committee. 
The oversight committee assists the Board but also has direct accountability to the regulator in cases 
of suspected deviant behaviour in relation to benchmark submitters.40 
The European approach further identifies benchmark calculation agents41 and publishers42 to be 
subject to the regulatory regime. These are subject to similar governance requirements such as 
relating to the establishment of effective internal control, conflict of interest management 
mechanisms. 
All three approaches call for extensive reporting and accountability to the regulators. In the UK, 
benchmark administrators are subject to quarterly reporting to regulators,43 and to inspection and 
supervisory scrutiny. The UK FCA also requires daily reporting of benchmark submissions data to the 
regulator44 and immediate reporting of suspicions of benchmark manipulation.45 The IOSCO 
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principles and European initiatives envisage transparency and accountability to the regulators46 and 
to the public, recommending that benchmark administrators establish a complaints procedure that 
can be accessed generally.47 Further, IOSCO principles and European initiatives also require the 
public publication of benchmark methodologies.48 The European initiatives envisage that such 
transparency would assist users in being diligent in continuously evaluating the quality of the 
financial benchmarks that they use.49 
Verstein argues that ex ante forms of governance would only give rise to cosmetic compliance and 
unintended consequences that arise from unnecessary prescriptions. 50 Although the governance 
framework appears comprehensive, it could be susceptible to being proceduralised51 and give rise to 
a box-ticking form of compliance. Regulators need to be mindful of the limitations of procedure-
based regulatory frameworks52 and engage in meaningful supervision to discern their effectiveness. 
That said, other commentators have observed how proceduralised regulatory frameworks give rise 
to increased transparency, accountability and improved substantive behaviour.53  
 (c) Governing the Benchmark Production Process 
Although benchmark administrators have proprietary rights over the financial benchmarks under 
their purview, they are not completely free to develop and produce the benchmarks as they see fit.  
The UK regulatory framework, the IOSCO standards and European approaches have all introduced 
certain prescriptions for the process of benchmark production. These prescriptions arguably reflect 
the public interest in the quality of and purposes served by the benchmarks concerned. In this way, 
the proprietisation approach may be regarded as a hybrid between market-based and regulatory 
governance, as financial benchmarks are not freely developed by benchmark administrators to any 
standard as they see fit as a matter of property. It may be argued that in this way, the 
proprietisation approach has not completely abrogated the previous relationship between free by-
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product indices and their wide user/stakeholder base. However, it may also be argued that the 
regulatory prescriptions are narrowly defined, and are specific to addressing the weaknesses 
uncovered in LIBOR. Hence, it remains questionable to what extent the regulatory prescriptions are 
indeed a means by which public or wider stakeholder interest can be represented in the process of 
benchmark production.  
There are two categories of regulatory prescriptions. One relates to the methodology that 
benchmark administrators should adopt in benchmark production. The second relates to benchmark 
administrators’ relationship with benchmark submitters who provide the necessary input into the 
benchmark production process. 
Methodological Prescriptions 
On the first, the IOSCO and European initiatives make somewhat detailed prescriptions for the 
methodology in benchmark production. Although the UK approach is silent on such prescription at 
the moment, this approach will have to fall into line when European legislation comes into force.54 
The IOSCO framework55 and European56 Regulation specify that transaction-based data57 should be 
used in benchmark production. Such transaction data should also represent the real economic 
realities in the market58 and be capable of measuring performance of a representative group in the 
market.59 This would require benchmark administrators to invest in adequate data collection and the 
development of a methodology to assimilate and use the data. Benchmark administrators are also 
compelled to introduce processes that ensure certainty and consistency in how data is used, such as 
a hierarchy of data input.60 In order to mitigate opportunities for manipulative conduct, 
discretionary judgment on the part of administrators is minimised. For example, the European 
Regulation permits the use of expert judgment subject to transparent and clear guidelines,61 and 
requires that benchmark production methodology should be published publicly for scrutiny. The 
European Regulation is also prescriptive on when data integrity may be questioned and additional 
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safeguards are needed.62 The IOSCO principles do not however provide for the exercise of 
discretionary judgment in the data input process for benchmark production.  
The emphasis on the use of actual transactions data is a response to the weakness of the previous 
LIBOR regime. In the LIBOR scandal, benchmark submitters played a key part. The benchmark was 
largely derived from quotes that were submitted by banks based on the hypothetical question ‘at 
what rate could you ... accept inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?’ As 
actual transaction data had become sparse in the market,63 the then-benchmark administrator, the 
British Bankers’ Association, relied exclusively on member banks’ submissions. Rogue individuals 
realised that these submissions could be manipulated and there would be little means of verifying 
them, and hence gaming the system became an infectious disease. Although the methodology used 
by the British Bankers’ Association would ignore outlier submissions in arriving at a trimmed average, 
the regime could not prevent or detect manipulative submissions. The regulatory response is 
therefore to move away from the use of submissions to the use of actual transactions data. This is 
also supported by prevailing research by independent scholars.64 However, transactions data 
remains sparse in the inter-bank lending market. Further, the use of transactions data is not a 
panacea for addressing manipulative practices. The foreign exchange rigging scandal has shown that 
it is possible to attempt manipulation even where there is actual trade data.65 In the foreign 
exchange rigging scandal, although the London WM Reuters 4pm fix is derived from transaction data, 
traders squeeze the close before the close of market in order to affect the exchange rate of 
currencies. Hence, even in a context where transaction data can be used to derive a benchmark, 
abusive practices can still find their way into the system. This brings into question how effectively 
proprietisation supported by regulation can really underscore benchmark quality where benchmark 
administrators do not have complete control over input factors and the quality of such inputs. 
Oversight of Benchmark Submitters 
Next, benchmark administrators are tasked to oversee benchmark submitters (or ‘contributors’ in 
the EU Regulation) where the latter are relevant to the benchmark production process. In the overall 
context, benchmark administrators are required to move away from relying on benchmark 
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submissions. However, where submissions may remain relevant, at least in the immediate term, 
benchmark administrators are responsible for overseeing submitters as part of their internal control 
relevant to the benchmark production process.  
There are limits to which regulatory intervention can be used to govern benchmark submitters, and 
reliance is placed on administrators to oversee submission conduct.  This is partly due to the 
proprietisation approach that regards the oversight of submissions as falling within administrators’ 
and not regulators’ direct purview. Further, as benchmark submission is a voluntary activity, it is 
impracticable to extend direct regulatory reach over it. Such voluntary submission, unlike 
benchmark administration, is not susceptible to being a regulated activity66 and the extension of 
regulatory governance to benchmark submission would just compel submitters to stop submitting in 
order to avoid compliance cost. This is counter-productive to the reliability of the benchmark as 
larger panels of submission are empirically proved to relate to more robust benchmarks.67  
The UK regulatory framework, IOSCO standards and European Regulation all provide that benchmark 
administrators are to develop a Code of Practice Standards for submitters68 and have oversight 
responsibilities over them. The UK has prescribed certain rules of governance and conduct for 
benchmark submitters,  such as robust internal control and the due management of conflicts of 
interest,69 with the EU guidelines and Regulation going into greater prescriptive detail.70 Further, the 
EU Regulation allows national regulators to scrutinise the sufficiency of the code of conduct and 
demand changes to be made if necessary.71 It is however questioned as to what extent national 
regulators may enforce against benchmark submitters directly, given the administrators’ primary 
jurisdiction over them. The IOSCO and EU frameworks are clear that regulators have limited 
jurisdiction over benchmark submitters.72  
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 It may be argued that it remains uncertain if benchmark submitters may have to be accountable to the FCA 
as it has general powers to carry out supervision and enforcement on the basis of its Handbook prescriptions, 
which apply directly to benchmark submitters. In which case it is unclear if administrators have primary 
The conduct of submitters remains an uneasy regulatory lacuna, as submitter conduct can affect the 
integrity of benchmarks and administrators may not always be incentivised to discipline submitters 
or indeed have adequate capacity to oversee them. It is queried to what extent administrators will 
effectively police compliance with their Code. The oversight of submitters adds cost to benchmark 
administration, and it would be easy to rely on box-ticking for cosmetic compliance to demonstrate 
that administrators have discharged oversight. Moreover, what incentives do benchmark 
administrators have in taking disciplinary enforcement against benchmark submitters? Benchmark 
administrators undertake the hassle and cost of disciplining submitters and risk losing their 
voluntary participation. Further, if there is a case of suspected manipulation, this would likely be 
dealt with at the regulator and not administrator level. This lacuna is recognised and being 
addressed in the UK in the form of a general individual conduct regulatory regime, which will be 
discussed in Section 4. However, Section 4 will point out that the extent of regulatory governance 
over price-related financial benchmarks brings into question both the credibility and usefulness of 
the proprietisation approach. 
(d) Designating Benchmark Administrators’ Responsibilities in Managing the Benchmark, Including 
its Attrition and Transition 
The UK regulatory framework requires that benchmark administrators take into account of the need 
to maintain ‘continuity of the specified benchmark including the need for contractual certainty for 
contracts which reference the specified benchmark’73 as part of their administration responsibilities. 
As a natural outworking of the proprietisation approach, benchmark administrators should be 
primarily responsible for managing the benchmark to meet market expectations and needs,  
including its entrenchment or its attrition. There is little regulatory guidance on market competition 
for benchmarks and whether administrators may entrench a benchmark. The EU Regulation provides 
that transparent and non-discriminatory access must be provided to users,74 but this can surely be 
done even by a benchmark administrator who has a monopoly over a critical benchmark. There is 
also inadequate guidance on how administrators are to manage a situation where a benchmark may 
be subject to attrition. The IOSCO guidelines and EU Regulation provide some prescriptive 
procedures but the main responsibility is placed on administrators to carry out benchmark 
transition.75  
The UK and IOSCO frameworks leave it very much to benchmark administrators to manage the 
attrition of a benchmark. It may be argued that this is the right approach given the logic of the 
proprietisation approach. Whether or not a financial benchmark that is proprietised remains popular 
and viable should surely not be up to regulatory intervention. However, if a benchmark should be 
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subject to attrition, there could be a crisis of confidence surrounding the benchmark and uncertainty 
in the market in relation to contractual outcomes that depend on such benchmarks. These may be 
situations of market instability or disruption. Thus, it is queried if the proprietisation approach is 
indeed the most appropriate to deal with such situations. Would benchmark administrators make 
arrangements with submitters so that participation is not truncated abruptly? Would administrators 
take leadership in designing standard transition clauses in contracts so that benchmark problems 
would not result in contractual uncertainty and disputes? The European guidelines are more 
sceptical of leaving to administrators to manage benchmark transitions, and try to avoid benchmark 
discontinuity altogether by recommending that administrators develop operational continuity for 
the benchmarks they administer and encourage submitters not to withdraw.76 This has now been 
developed in the EU Regulation. The Regulation now provides for administrators to determine if 
benchmarks have ceased, either by transferring to another administrator or if the benchmark can be 
wound down for being no longer critical. As there are objective criteria for determining ‘criticality’ of 
a benchmark, the Regulation provides some safeguards against arbitrary decisions taken by 
administrators. However, the substantive decision to terminate or transition out of certain 
benchmarks rests in administrators’ hands, consistent with the logic of proprietisation. Neither 
regulators nor users would be able to have a voice in such decision. 
The EU Regulation allows regulators to exercise more powers in the event of benchmark transition in 
relation to critical benchmarks. The EU Regulation constrains submitters from ceasing to submit if 
the benchmark is critical,77 by allowing national regulators to compel submission for no more than 4 
weeks, or 12 or 24 months after review of the necessity to maintain the benchmark.78  
It may be argued that proprietisation provides sufficient incentives for benchmark administrators to 
prevent benchmark attrition from occurring. Such attrition may be unlikely if the quality of the 
benchmark is maintained and well-administered. Although the prevention of benchmark attrition is 
an easy way of preserving market stability, on the other hand, the entrenchment of benchmarks may 
stifle market innovation and distort the market for benchmarks. Further, the article is sceptical of 
the attempt to prevent benchmark attrition such as by compelling benchmark submission (as in the 
European Regulation). It may be futile and market-distorting to prevent market forces from 
operating in respect of moving away from certain benchmarks.  
If benchmark attrition indeed occurs, a situation of market disruption and instability may entail. It is 
uncertain whether the EU Regulation’s provisions for national regulators to constantly assess the 
market situation to compel continued benchmark submission is sufficient to address market needs. 
Ultimately this is an issue that requires thought and preparation on the part of benchmark 
administrators in anticipation of benchmark attrition. The regulatory approaches discussed do not 
address how regulators would ensure administrators carry this out adequately. The needs of market 
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stability may expose the limitations of the proprietisation approach in benchmark regulation after all. 
These will be discussed in the next Section. 
4. Critically Evaluating the Proprietisation Approach in Regulating Price-related Financial 
Benchmarks 
Achievements of the Proprietisation Approach 
It may be argued that the proprietisation approach creates the right incentives for financial 
benchmarks to be duly produced and maintained. Benchmark administrators could deploy the 
revenues earned from licensing towards the institution of robust data collection and analytical 
systems in order to generate credible financial benchmarks. Such is key to maintaining market 
confidence and stability. In this way, regulators would achieve the public interest objective of market 
stability by co-opting the market-based governance provided by benchmark administrators. This is a 
form of ‘smart’ regulation,79 where the alignment of regulatory and private interest objectives result 
in an effective form of market-based governance that also serves public interest needs. 
However, the proprietisation approach entails certain tradeoffs. Benchmark administrators’ licensing 
regimes would make it more costly for users to access price-related financial benchmarks. It is noted 
that that ICE does make historic LIBOR data available to the public 3 days late,80 so it may be argued 
that a compromise has been reached in meeting benchmark administrators’ and users’ needs. 
However, the licensing scheme favours subscribers who can gain sooner access to LIBOR than other 
users. It is queried if this could give rise to opportunities for certain market participants to take 
advantage of others, largely retail users.  In other words, although proprietisation may strengthen 
the governance of the benchmark, users’ interest in having an accessible transaction-cost reduction 
mechanism may be undermined. 
Further, this article suggests that it is only apparent that ‘smart’ regulation is achieved. This is 
because benchmark administrators enjoy a high level of regulatory subsidy. This article argues that 
the regulatory subsidy not only brings into question the legitimacy of the extent of proprietisation, it 
also reinforces proprietisation in such a way as to bring about two other problems. One is that the 
benchmarks subject to administration may become entrenched, and this affects market innovation 
for benchmarks and distorts market competition. Second, benchmark administrators may become 
entrenched too and perhaps systemically important due to their impact on market stability.  This 
could pose problems for the regulation and supervision of benchmark administrators.  
Regulatory Subsidy Underlying Benchmark Administrators’ Proprietisation 
We turn first to the nature of the regulatory subsidy for benchmark administrators. The key features 
of the regulatory subsidy are: (a) the regulatory framework for market transparency under the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 2014; (b) the criminal sanctions regime introduced by 
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the UK and EU for benchmark manipulation and (c) the individual conduct regime introduced in the 
UK such as the Senior Persons Regime, and the forthcoming individual conduct regime of wider 
application as recommended by the UK Fair and Effective Markets Review. In other words, 
benchmark administrators are heavily ‘subsidised’ by existing regulatory frameworks and 
supervision and it may be queried as to the extent of the true value added by administrators to 
justify their proprietisation. 
Although benchmark administrators have to invest in information collection and analytical 
capabilities in order to generate benchmarks, they are greatly helped by the comprehensive 
framework for regulatory transparency. 81 Since 2004,82 price transparency has been mandated for 
pre and post-trade information on all European exchanges, electronic trading facilities and 
systematic internalisers (firms that practice cancelling buy and sell orders within their trading 
book).83 These measures were introduced in order to encourage the rise of market competition and 
to mitigate excessive fragmentation of markets.84 After the global financial crisis 2007-9, market 
transparency obligations greatly expanded in European legislation in order to meet the needs of risk 
surveillance. The European Markets Infrastructure Regulation 2013 (EMIR) mandated central 
clearing of over-the-counter derivative and swap products in order to standardise them and create 
more transparency surrounding them. The Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 2014 also 
brought a wider range of markets such as over-the-counter markets within its scope in order to 
comply with an expanded regime of mandatory market transparency.85 
Benchmark administrators benefit greatly from the existing regulatory framework for 
comprehensive and prescribed market transparency. For example, as ICE owns and operates equity 
and futures markets and exchanges including the LIFFE and New York Stock Exchange, and a number 
of clearing facilities, much of the data it needs for benchmark production is delivered in compliance 
with regulatory requirements.  
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Further, the regulatory framework for sanctions against benchmark manipulation also provides a 
subsidy for benchmark administrators’ proprietisation. The private property in benchmarks is 
protected by public enforcement, as criminal and administrative sanctions can be carried out against 
conduct that seeks to damage a benchmark. In the UK and EU, criminal sanctions and administrative 
penalty regimes have been introduced to deter those who tarnish financial benchmarks. The EU has 
included benchmark manipulation in its interpretation of ‘market manipulation’,86 which is 
punishable by criminal and administrative sanctions.  The scope of market abuse traditionally 
includes insider dealing and market manipulation, such conduct being regarded as anti-social 
behaviour that undermine market trust and efficiency.87 The IOSCO report encourages benchmark 
manipulation to be credibly punished,88 and the UK has gone further than the EU and IOSCO by 
proposing to extend market abuse sanctions to financial benchmarks in FICC markets,89 where those 
are beyond the scope of markets covered by the EU Regulation.90 
To date, spectacular punishments have been meted out to institutions and individuals engaged in 
benchmark manipulation. Many financial institutions have been imposed with eye-watering fines.91 
Benchmark manipulation is a symptom of underlying toxic culture92 in many financial institutions 
uncovered in the wake of the global financial crisis 2007-9, hence punishment for firms has been 
indisputably socially visible.93 Further, as benchmark manipulation has largely been carried out by 
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determined groups of individuals, individual prosecutions are also being mounted and secured. 94 
Convicted individuals may expect to be punished in a deterrent manner, such as the imprisonment 
sentence of 14 years handed out to Tom Hayes.95 
Third, it is suggested that general individual conduct regimes such as the UK’s Approved and Senior 
Persons regime and the wider individual conduct regime suggested by the Fair and Effective Markets 
Review would likely supersede benchmark administrators’ role in overseeing and governing 
submitters. The FCA96 and IOSCO’s reviews of benchmark administrators conclude that there is 
ample room for improvement on administrators’ part in overseeing submitters, hence the scepticism 
expressed earlier regarding administrators’ capacity and incentives to oversee submitters seems 
supported by such survey results. 97 The enhancement of individual conduct regulation will likely 
exceed what administrators carry out in terms of standard setting, supervision and enforcement. 
This is a form of regulatory subsidy provided to support administrators in benchmark production, 
and one may query to what extent benchmark administrators should enjoy the benefits of 
proprietisation on the back of such regulatory subsidy.  
The UK regulator has always maintained an individual conduct regime that sets broadly worded 
standards of integrity, care and accountability for individuals assuming ‘controlled functions’ in the 
financial sector.98 In the wake of the global financial crisis, legislative reform was carried out to 
enhance the standards and responsibilities applicable to a wide scope of individuals working in the 
financial sector and in particular to senior persons.99 As benchmark administration and submission 
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now fall within the scope of regulated activities under the purview of the FCA,100 individuals engaged 
in these activities would be subject to the standards under the Approved Persons Regime,101 and 
senior persons who have oversight of these activities would be subject to additional standards 
imposed via the FCA’s senior persons regime or otherwise known as “accountable significant-
influence functions” regime.102 The FCA now requires firms that make benchmark submissions to 
appoint a senior person to oversee submissions.103 
Approved persons are required to adhere to standards of integrity, due care, skill and diligence, 
observance of proper standards of market conduct and cooperativeness with regulators. Failure to 
adhere to these standards may result in enforcement action taken by the FCA which could culminate 
in monetary fines and disqualification from working in certain capacities or altogether in the 
financial sector.104 As for senior persons, in addition to the conduct rules applicable to approved 
persons, they must ensure that the business of the firm for which they are responsible is effectively 
governed and controlled, compliance with regulations is achieved and that due care, skill and 
diligence is exercised such over any delegation of responsibilities.105  
It is observed that the FCA and its predecessor the FSA have over the years taken a number of high 
profile actions against senior persons for failure to adhere to standards of individual conduct.106 The 
credible threat of personal liability under the senior persons regime would undoubtedly affect the 
incentives of senior persons in discharging their benchmark-related responsibilities. 
Further, the Fair and Effective Markets Review has now proposed to extend the approved and senior 
persons regime for banks, insurers and investment firms to FICC firms so that individual conduct may 
be subject to the same high standards of integrity, care and accountability.107  This recommendation 
brings conduct regulation for individuals to be on par with investment and securities markets, so 
introducing the same baseline across the financial sector. Hence, individuals in FICC markets 
involved in benchmark submission and administration activities will also be caught within the scope 
of the personal liability regimes discussed above. The Review also recommends the establishment of 
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a new FICC Standards Board to better govern trading conduct108 and set professionalism 
qualifications and training requirements for FICC traders.109 The comprehensive regulation of senior 
managers and individuals is likely to be the most promising way of addressing conduct deficits 
generally, and may in due course supersede the somewhat narrow existing framework for governing 
benchmark submitters. 
In sum, the protection of the property in financial benchmarks is heavily underlined by regulatory 
obligations in market transparency, enforcement against benchmark manipulation and the 
regulation of individual conduct. As benchmark administrators are heavily ‘subsidised’ by existing 
regulatory frameworks and supervision, it may be queried as to the extent of the true value added 
by administrators to justify their proprietisation. It may be argued that the regulatory regimes 
discussed above should not be regarded as ‘regulatory subsidies’ as these exist anyway as part of the 
financial regulation fabric and are not brought in to support the regulation of financial benchmarks 
in particular.  This argument may be true for the market transparency and individual conduct 
regulation discussed above, but the criminal and administrative regimes in market abuse certainly 
provide a major subsidy for benchmark administrators. It may even be argued that the protection of 
financial benchmarks by market abuse sanctions is contrary to the proprietisation approach which 
should incentivise the designated ‘property owners’ to pursue enforcement against those that 
attempt to damage such property. But the immediate sensibility of extending market abuse 
enforcement against benchmark manipulators is self-evident, as the anti-social behaviour of a few 
against the integrity of a collective market good should be punished at a social level. Here is where 
the limits of the proprietisation approach, which is based on a private market good characterisation 
of financial benchmarks, is revealed. The proprietisation approach neglects the essential collective 
nature of price-related financial benchmarks, and the need for forms of regulatory subsidy to protect 
the collective interest in such goods. Hence, the appropriate parameters of such proprietisation 
should be called into question. 
Benchmark Entrenchment? 
Next, we turn to the weaknesses and drawbacks in the proprietisation approach. We argue that the 
chief weaknesses are the entrenchment of benchmarks and the undermining of competition in the 
market for benchmarks, and the rising systemic importance of benchmark administrators. 
With the introduction of licensing regimes for financial benchmarks, it may be argued that the user-
pays regime will provide market discipline for benchmark administrators. Users could vote with their 
feet110 if benchmark administrators are not delivering the goods of credible and reliable financial 
benchmarks, and users could subscribe to alternative benchmarks. The threat of user migration may 
provide the necessary incentives for benchmark administrators to remain competitive in providing 
robust and credible benchmarks. 
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However, user discipline would only be effective if there is choice in the market for benchmarks. The 
market for price-related benchmarks is not competitive at the moment, and this is partly due to the 
proprietisation approach adopted in regulation. Administrators have every incentive to entrench 
their benchmarks as they incur significant sunk costs in governance and methodology investments 
and therefore would seek to protect their proprietisation. For example, the relatively low cost 
methodology in getting bank quotes for LIBOR submissions from a limited panel must give way to 
more sophisticated methods of combining wider panel bank quotes with real transaction data such 
as in overnight index swaps, repo markets etc. The investment in data collection and assimilation as 
well as methodological systems would be costly. The mandatory requirement to regularly review 
and perhaps back-test the credibility of benchmarks would also be costly. Such cost can only be 
recouped through rigorous exploitation of the proprietised benchmarks.  
Further, the proprietisation approach, which is supported by regulatory governance, provides a 
favourable advantage to incumbent benchmark administrators as the regulatory regime underscores 
market confidence in benchmark quality. Users are likely to regard administrators’ regulatory 
compliance as a proxy for benchmark quality and would support the entrenchment of the 
benchmark by sticking to its adoption. 
The nature of price-related benchmarks is such that they also attract network effects, and so the 
market is inherently likely to be uncompetitive. With the bias towards incumbent benchmark 
administrators and barriers to entry created by regulation for new benchmarks, the landscape is 
made less favourable than perhaps necessary for market innovation and challengers to existing 
benchmarks. 
Finally, it can be argued that even if the entrenchment of financial benchmarks compromises the 
user choice objective, benchmark stability promotes market stability. The objective of market 
stability may thus be contrary to the needs of user choice. Policy makers opted for benchmark 
preservation in the wake of manipulation scandals precisely because of the stabilising effects of such 
a move. The attrition of existing benchmarks is regarded as highly likely to introduce market 
disruptions, and such is adversely perceived by many market participants. Is market stability more 
desired by market participants than choice? The short termist nature of this measure is likely to be 
quickly revealed-  if market innovation for alternative benchmarks is stifled, longer term 
developments in efficiency may become sacrificed for short term market stability. Further, as will be 
discussed in relation to systemic importance of benchmarks and administrators, the entrenchment 
of benchmarks is not a safeguard for long-term market stability either. 
The FSB111 has recognised the implications of benchmark proprietisation and the lack of market 
discipline for benchmark administrators. It is now seeking to encourage the development of 
alternative interest rate-based benchmarks by providing blueprints that can be further developed. 
This development seems like an afterthought to the introduction of elaborate regulatory regimes 
already achieved, and one wonders how effective this will be in mitigating the weaknesses discussed. 
The regulation of credit rating agencies,112 in the wake of revelations regarding their failures to rate 
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structured products accurately prior to the global financial crisis, also took the approach of 
introducing elaborate regulatory and accountability regimes for established agencies, and this could 
introduce moral hazard in terms of endorsing their ratings. Regulators are now embarking on a 
determined exercise to encourage less regulatory and industry reliance on credit ratings.113  Like the 
FSB’s call for alternative benchmarks to be developed in light of regulatory regimes that favour 
entrenchment of existing benchmarks, regulatory measures do not seem consistent and it remains 
unpredictable what may be achieved. 
The development of alternative benchmarks however serves another useful purpose besides 
introducing choice to users. The availability of alternative benchmarks may encourage reduced 
reliance on incumbent benchmarks, making them less of a systemic issue if any benchmark should 
be subject to attrition. Further, competition can be introduced among benchmark administrators so 
that administrators may not become systemically important and pose problems for regulatory 
governance over them.114 This article will examine how policy reforms may achieve this shortly. 
Benchmark Attrition and Transition 
The entrenchment of any particular financial benchmark will augment the risk of market disruption 
and instability should the benchmark become damaged or subject to attrition or transition. This 
prospect results in a vicious cycle where the fear of market instability would feed back into policy-
making that supports the preservation and entrenchment of the financial benchmark concerned. As 
discussed above, the proprietisation approach that shapes current regulatory frameworks reposes 
the benchmark transition decision in administrators, and current regulatory frameworks provide 
minimal guidance on how the consequences of benchmark transition are to be managed. As such, 
we do not think current regulatory frameworks would necessarily be sufficient to safeguard market 
instability in the face of benchmark transition. We argue that more reform is needed in this area to 
overcome the weaknesses in current regulatory frameworks. 
One way to address the fear of market instability would be to consider if regulators and not 
benchmark administrators, should have the leading role in managing benchmark crises. The 
proprietisation approach logically confers the power of managing benchmark crises to benchmark 
administrators- after all it is their responsibility to manage their property. Although the EU 
Regulation allows national regulators to intervene in critical benchmarks by compelling benchmark 
submissions to continue, this is a backward-looking and limited form of intervention power. There 
are no wider powers for regulatory intervention if critical benchmark transitions entail stressful 
consequences. This article argues that the management of benchmark crises is an area that exposes 
the fundamental limitations of the proprietisation approach.  
Although it may be argued that benchmark administrators have every incentive not to bring about a 
benchmark crisis, we should not be unprepared for such a possibility. A financial benchmark may be 
compromised by undetected misconduct until very late, or be compromised if a methodology earlier 
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trusted proves to be imperfect. We are concerned that that it would be inherently difficult for 
administrators to prepare a satisfactory contingency plan as they may not be able to grasp the full 
impact of a benchmark crisis. They may not be completely aware of the scope of the user base for 
the benchmark beyond the identified subscribers, and hence the needs to be met. In other words, 
benchmark administrators may not be able to deal with the systemic risk that flows from a 
benchmark crisis. The logic of the proprietisation approach in this case would fail to address the 
needs of market stability. In such a case, perhaps regulatory intervention is needed to manage such 
a crisis and uphold the wider objectives of market stability and confidence. This will be discussed 
shortly. 
Systemic Importance of Benchmark Administrators? 
This article also argues that the proprietisation approach could lead to the augmenting of 
administrators’ importance and give rise to new issues of systemically important institutions. For 
example, ICE has already gained administration rights over LIBOR, ISDAFIX and the LBMA Gold Fix. 
Although there are potential attractions to installing benchmark administrators who enjoy 
economies of scale and network effects, benchmark administrators who manage a number of key 
price-related benchmarks may augment the distorting effects upon market competition for 
benchmarks and also become systemically important to the maintenance of market stability. 
Regulators have to beware that such benchmark administrators could become practically 
irremoveable and this may create tensions and dilemmas in effective supervision. Further, 
benchmark administrators who become too important may have a disproportionate impact on 
market stability if their institutional stability or conduct comes into question. 115 Dealing with 
systemically important benchmark administrators also puts regulators in a disadvantageous position 
as they may adopt more caution in supervisory dealings, and in potential enforcement.  
A Balanced Approach to Mitigating the Consequences of Proprietisation 
The above discussion raises questions as to what objectives are met in financial benchmark 
regulation and whether the proprietisation approach can meet them. In the wake of benchmark 
manipulation scandals, much emphasis has been placed on preserving market confidence in existing 
benchmarks and maintaining market stability. However, those objectives may only be met in the 
short term. Further, it is also important to ensure that users have access to efficient transaction-cost 
reducing mechanisms. It is arguable, drawing from the above discussion, that the regulatory 
framework has emphasised the needs of short term market stability over the needs of access and 
choice available to users. Further, although the proprietisation approach has at the moment 
successfully preserved trust in existing benchmarks and meets the needs of immediate term market 
stability, the drawbacks of the proprietisation approach may indeed compromise longer term 
market stability needs.  The above discussion warns that entrenched benchmarks and systemically 
important administrators that are in crisis may create more severe market disruptions.  
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This article does not go as far as to suggest that the proprietisation approach is completely mistaken. 
Benchmark administrators do perform an important role in protecting and maintaining existing 
financial benchmarks without attracting the adverse perceptions that revolve around publicising a 
benchmark. However, as benchmark administrators’ private interests may deviate from objectives 
that are important in the public interest, such as ensuring that users have choice and access to 
efficient transaction-cost reducing mechanisms, this article argues that the proprietisation needs to 
be balanced with appropriate regulatory intervention to provide for the objectives that are unlikely 
to be met by the proprietisation approach. The following sketches the contours of the adjustments 
we see as necessary for the existing regulatory regimes. 
First, the scope of proprietisation may be adjusted considering the limits of the characterisation of 
financial benchmarks as private market goods. Although the article has no firm position on this, 
policy makers can explore ways of making designated outfits responsible for benchmark protection 
and quality maintenance without the full extent of commercialisation. For example, not-for-profit 
institutions can be designated to assume stewardship over certain financial benchmarks, supported 
by at-cost fees.116 In the alternative, for-profit organisations can be made subject to terms of licence 
circumscribing their proprietary freedoms and to wider accountability, scrutiny or participation by 
not-for-profit stakeholder groups. Such measures may introduce a public interest bent to the 
administration of benchmarks that addresses some of the weaknesses of proprietisation and 
commercialisation.  
Further, it is suggested that regulatory intervention in financial benchmark regulation can be 
improved in two areas that are not currently addressed in the UK framework, the IOSCO’s standards 
or the European initiatives. 
First, the regulator can promote competition in the market for financial benchmarks, starting with 
the suggestions made by the Financial Stability Board.117 The UK Financial Conduct Authority is 
vested with a market competition objective118 and is actively using its mandate to ensure that 
consumer markets remain competitive,119 such as in retirement income,120 cash savings121 and 
insurance add-on products,122 and in the wholesale sector.123 We argue that such a mandate can also 
be extended to ensuring that the market for benchmark innovation remains competitive. The FCA 
should be watchful for barriers to entry for challengers of existing financial benchmarks. We are of 
the view that healthy market competition will also help mitigate the systemic importance of 
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incumbent financial benchmarks, and the systemic importance of certain benchmark administrators. 
The promotion of the competition objective in the financial benchmarks market will encourage 
diversity in the adoption of transaction-cost reduction mechanisms in financial contracts, and this 
could help achieve the twin objectives of improving user choice and reducing the systemic 
importance of certain benchmarks and their administrators. 
Second, the regulator should also play a key role in managing benchmark attrition and transition, as 
such a role is important in providing a secure platform upon which benchmark competition can take 
place. In other words, benchmark competition can be promoted with confidence as there would be 
in place a framework for managing the consequences of benchmark attrition and transition. The 
current policy thinking in the UK and IOSCO that leaves benchmark administrators to manage 
benchmark attritions and transitions is arguably mistaken, as benchmark administrators are not 
incentivised to develop such a framework that could encourage market competition and damage 
their commercial interests. Hence, the framework for certainty and predictability in managing 
benchmark attrition and transition is a public good that needs to be provided by regulators. 
Further, overseeing benchmark attrition and transition is arguably a form of crisis management 
which regulators are best placed to do in securing the public interest of market stability in those 
situations. Benchmark administrators’ expertise lie in benchmark production, and such expertise 
does not necessarily lend itself to a capacity for managing crises of wider proportions. The 
proprietisation approach suffers from the fundamental limitation of being unlikely to incentivise 
benchmark administrators to respond to a benchmark crisis. Benchmark administrators dedicate 
their energies to entrenching and exploiting benchmarks, not managing benchmark crises. If a 
benchmark crisis should occur, regulatory intervention would be needed as immediate needs of 
market stability have to be met. 
Regulators could, in a situation of a benchmark crisis, take over the temporary administration of a 
benchmark if a major benchmark becomes impeached or damaged, in order to regulate transitional 
matters for myriad transactions. This provides confidence and certainty for transactions, protects 
users, and allows regulators to exercise necessary powers to achieve the wider interest of market 
stability. However this power should be applied sparingly. This suggestion is unlikely out of line with 
the trend of developing regulator-managed paradigms for financial crisis management and 
resolution of financial institutions, as has come into place in the US,124 Europe125 and UK.126  
It may however be argued that benchmark transition and attrition cannot be dealt with by 
regulators as such would amount to ‘nationalising’ a financial benchmark. ‘Nationalising’ a 
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benchmark could be perceived to be futile if the benchmark is systemically important beyond a 
domestic market, such as for the EU as a whole, and it would be inappropriate for any national 
regulator to administer it. The article suggests that where the EU is concerned, ESMA may be able to 
temporarily administer such an impaired benchmark due to systemic implications in Europe as it is a 
body that is building up administrative capacity in direct regulation and governance.  Further, 
ESMA’s regulatory objectives in prudential systemic risk oversight and consumer protection in the 
EU would be able to support such a role of benchmark crisis management.127  
However, what if the benchmark concerned originates from a third country outside of Europe? In 
such a situation, the regulatory administration of a benchmark would need cooperation from other 
major jurisdictions. The cross-border management of a benchmark crisis may require co-ordination 
from a number of regulators, but this difficulty is not a novel challenge given that all cross-border 
financial supervision suffers from the same challenge.128 IOSCO could also play a coordinating role in 
such situations, boosting its profile as an international body that provides a platform for 
international dialogue and cooperation. Colleges of international supervisors could also be 
developed for key financial benchmarks, as consistent with the practices in cross-border cooperation 
in banking supervision.129 In spite of challenges in securing pan-European or international regulatory 
action, it remains important that national, pan-European or international regulatory intervention is 
available in managing benchmark crises.  
It is also important that the crisis management powers for regulators are proportionate and subject 
to transparent and accountable processes, so that the normalisation of benchmark administration 
can be returned to once stable conditions have been achieved. Like in other crisis management 
powers, it is a work in progress to achieve an appropriate and balanced suspension of market-based 
forces in favour of regulatory intervention.  In view of the public interest benefits that can be 
achieved, regulatory intervention in benchmark crisis management should not be viewed with 
excessive unease. 
The ‘proprietisation’ approach over-emphasises the market-based characteristics of price-related 
financial benchmarks and relies on commercial incentives and market discipline to ensure the 
protection of benchmark quality. However this characterisation is incomplete as price-related 
benchmarks are collective goods by nature which coalesce towards network effects. Hence, the 
proprietisation approach will fail to address the limits of market-based governance for such goods, 
which are discussed above. This article suggests that a more modest scope of stewardship over such 
benchmarks can be assumed by a non-regulatory body, as the full implications of proprietisation do 
not seem supported, in light of benchmark administration being heavily subsidised by regulatory 
supervision and enforcement, such as in market abuse enforcement. Moreover, moving away from 
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the full implications of proprietisation will allow more regulatory intervention to be developed in 
crucial areas such as benchmark transition and attrition where the public interest needs of market 
stability are unlikely to be met by private sector administration of such benchmarks.  
5. Conclusion 
This article argues that the key regulatory approach in addressing financial benchmark scandals in 
the wake of the LIBOR, foreign exchange and gold rigging episodes is that of appointing benchmark 
administrators to proprietise existing financial benchmarks in order to commercialise, protect and 
maintain them, thus restoring market confidence and stability. The article discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings and policy drivers for such an approach, and argues that the regulatory framework in 
the UK, IOSCO’s standards and the European Regulation have all taken this approach although some 
differences in the detail of their frameworks can be detected.  The proprietisation approach is 
matched by obligations imposed on benchmark administrators to comply with regulators’ 
requirements in relation to internal governance and accountability, as well as prescriptions for the 
due production of benchmarks and the exercise of oversight of benchmark submitters.  
The article critically queries the implications of such proprietisation. It questions whether, in light of 
massive regulatory subsidy, the extent of proprietisation is really matched by the value added by 
benchmark administrators. Although some benefits are achieved by the proprietisation approach, 
such as the avoidance of adverse perceptions surrounding the alternative approach of publicising 
key financial benchmarks, there are drawbacks to the proprietisation approach that relate to the 
possible limitation of user choice and entrenchment of benchmarks. These also entail other 
consequences such as the augmentation of the systemic importance of financial benchmarks and 
benchmark administrators, which are adversely related to the longer term needs of market stability. 
The article observes that the FSB is embarking on nascent efforts to mitigate some of the drawbacks 
of benchmark proprietisation by introducing competition in the benchmark market and encouraging 
the development of alternative benchmarks. However, such may run counter to the current 
regulatory design and would need the support of more regulatory reform. The article suggests some 
readjustment to the proprietisation approach and a balance of appropriate regulatory intervention. 
Regulatory intervention is especially needed in order to safeguard market competition in benchmark 
innovation and in addressing benchmark transition and attrition. The current frameworks for 
governing financial benchmarks do not at the moment adequately address the above. The article 
does not argue that the proprietisation approach is mistaken but that it is important to reconsider its 
parameters and introduce an adequate measure of regulatory balance to address its fundamental 
limitations. 
Appendix 1 
Table for Comparison of the UK, IOSCO and EU approaches to regulating benchmark 
administrators: 
 UK FCA MAR 8 OICU-IOSCO EBA/ESMA guidelines/ 
proposed EU 
legislation 
Governance structure Somewhat meta-
regulatory130 in nature: 
‘effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements’ 
Appointment of 
benchmark 
administration 
manager responsible 
for compliance 
Regular review and 
surveillance of quality 
of benchmark 
submissions 
Institution of internal 
whistle-blowing 
procedures 
‘credible and 
transparent 
governance and 
oversight’ 
Expertise of 
benchmark 
administrators 
Institution of internal 
control framework for 
management of 
conflicts of interest 
and ensuring 
compliance 
Whistleblowing 
framework 
Internal control for 
data collection 
Appointment of 
internal or external 
auditor who is 
independent to 
periodically report on 
administrator’s 
compliance 
Record keeping of all 
data, submissions, 
‘effective governance 
and compliance 
processes to ensure 
the quality of the 
benchmark’ 
Appropriate criteria for 
appointment of 
members of governing 
bodies or compliance 
Internal control 
mechanisms for 
administrator, 
submitters and other 
third party outsources 
Internal control over 
quality of data 
submitted 
Whistle-blowing 
procedures 
Disciplinary procedures 
Record keeping of all 
oversight committee’s 
meetings with 
administrator, third 
parties etc for 5 years 
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policies etc for 5 years Record keeping of all 
data used for 
benchmark calculation 
to enable external 
audit 
Limitations on 
outsourcing unless 
adequate supervision 
of outsourcees can be 
put in place 
Governance principles Organisational and 
governance 
arrangements to 
identify and manage 
conflicts of interest 
Ensuring 
confidentiality of 
benchmark 
submissions 
Management of 
conflicts of interest in 
prescribed detail down 
to staff reporting lines, 
segregation of 
responsibilities and 
staff remuneration 
Robustness of 
operations such as 
contingency measures 
for failures in inputs or 
markets or critical 
functions 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
 
Accountability Institution of oversight 
committee 
represented by 
submitters, markets 
and non-executive 
directors of the 
administrator 
Code of practice for 
benchmark submitters 
Determining scope, 
definition and 
methodologies for 
benchmark  
Review of benchmark 
submissions and 
quality 
Institution of 
independent oversight 
function to review 
benchmark quality and 
methodology, 
outsourcing, 
commissioning internal 
or external audits 
Oversight committee 
to also monitor for 
benchmark 
manipulation, code of 
conduct for submitters 
Oversight function or 
committee 
Committee has power 
to directly report 
irregularities to 
regulator 
Regulation: External 
audit 
Methodology None prescribed General principle of 
‘accurate and reliable 
representation of the 
economic realities of 
the Interest it seeks to 
measure, and 
eliminate factors that 
might result in a 
distortion of the price, 
rate, index or value of 
the Benchmark’ 
Data sufficiency 
required, preference 
for transaction-based 
data in active markets, 
that are bona fides, 
arms-length 
transactions. 
Hierarchy of data input 
to be constructed, with 
preference for market 
data above but 
permitting quotes, bids 
and offer data 
Explicit setting out of 
methodology for 
calculation to be made 
at least to 
stakeholders, term 
undefined 
General principle of 
‘Benchmark should 
represent adequately 
the market, strategy or 
interest to which it 
refers, and measure 
the performance of a 
representative group 
of underlying 
transactions in a 
relevant and 
appropriate way’ 
Methodologies must 
be rigorous, systematic 
and continuous, similar 
to the regulation of 
credit ratings quality131 
Preference for 
transaction-based 
data, permitting non-
transaction data  
Regulation: safeguards 
needed where input 
data is mainly not 
transaction-based data 
and any submitter 
contributes to more 
than 50% of value of 
transactions in market 
Regulation: Input data 
hierarchy to be clearly 
established 
Regulation: Expert 
judgment can be used 
subject to transparent 
and clear guidelines 
Methodologies to be 
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subject to regular 
review 
Methodologies subject 
to public transparency 
 
Oversight of third 
parties 
Not explicit but can be 
inferred from meta-
regulatory provisions 
on effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements in order 
to ensure due 
administration and 
publication of 
benchmark 
Written policies and 
procedures to manage 
outsourced third 
parties 
Monitor third parties 
for compliance 
Contingency 
arrangements if third 
parties fail to deliver 
Transparency of third 
parties’ identities to 
relevant regulators and 
stakeholders, term 
undefined 
Regulation: Adequate 
supervision of 
outsourcees 
ESMA/EBA: Direct 
guidelines addressed 
to benchmark 
calculation agents and 
benchmark publishers 
in terms of having 
robust internal 
governance for 
compliance, conflicts 
of interest 
management, error 
detection and 
certification of 
compliance to 
administrator 
Transparency Only to regulator To regulators, as per 
below 
To stakeholders, in 
terms of benchmark 
methodologies, third 
party outsources, 
conflicts of interest 
and policies, and 
transition policies for 
benchmarks 
Complaints procedure 
for benefit of 
stakeholders 
EBA/ESMA: Disclosure 
of governance and 
compliance committee 
members to public 
Disclosure of 
benchmark 
methodology to public 
Regulation: 
Transparency of 
benchmark data 
subject to Commission 
delegated legislation 
EBA/ESMA: 
Certification of 
compliance to public 
EBA/ESMA: Complaints 
procedures but 
uncertain whether 
internal or external 
EBA/ESMA: Direct 
guidelines addressed 
to users viz users must 
use sufficient due 
diligence to ascertain 
that all parties in the 
benchmark production 
processes comply with 
guidelines; and that 
users must regularly 
assess the suitability 
and relevance of a 
benchmark 
Relations with 
regulator 
Notification to FCA of 
suspected breaches by 
administrator or 
submitter 
Notification to FCA of 
suspected benchmark 
manipulation 
Reporting to FCA daily 
on all benchmark 
submissions 
Providing FCA with 
quarterly aggregate 
statistics 
All documents and 
audit trail to be 
available to regulator 
Disclosure of conflicts 
of interest and policies 
Regulation: 
Registration system for 
benchmark 
administrators, 
recognition of third 
country administrators 
based on equivalence 
and allowing 
registered 
administrators to use 
third country 
benchmark based on 
equivalent supervision 
and arrangement in 
place with ESMA.  
Scrutiny over 
benchmark 
methodology  
EBA/ESMA: Scrutiny 
over audit trail and 
oversight committee’s 
meetings 
EBA/ESMA: Reporting 
of suspected 
irregularities, 
Regulation will leave 
the specifics to 
delegated Commission 
legislation 
EBA/ESMA: 
Cooperation with 
regulators over any 
other query 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Table of Comparison between the UK, IOSCO and European Regulatory Regimes for Governing 
Benchmark Submitters 
 UK FCA OICU-IOSCO EBA/ESMA guidelines 
and EU legislation 
Governance structure ‘effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements’ 
Appointment of 
benchmark manager to 
ensure compliance 
Responsibility for 
oversight of 
benchmark submission 
to reside with senior 
personnel 
Benchmark submitter 
to be based on UK 
Record keeping of 
benchmark 
submissions and 
relevant data for 5 
years 
Appointment of 
independent auditor 
for yearly report on 
compliance (not 
explicit on whether 
internal or external 
auditor) 
Internal systems and 
controls to deal with 
-management of 
conflicts of interest 
-application of 
methodology 
-pre-submission 
validation by senior 
personnel 
-internal sign-off 
procedures for 
submission 
-whistleblowing 
policies 
-suspicious submission 
reporting policies 
-clear roles and 
responsibilities and 
reporting lines for key 
personnel 
Record keeping 
Training of personnel 
in terms of compliance 
with market abuse 
regulation 
Clear internal policies 
developed for 
submissions, internal 
control, training, 
record-keeping, 
compliance, internal 
audit, disciplinary 
procedures, 
complaints 
management and 
escalation 
Effective 
organisational and 
administrative 
arrangements to 
manage conflicts of 
interest, highly 
prescribed eg 
EBA/ESMA: as to 
exchange of 
information between 
staff, prevention of 
collusion or exercise of 
inappropriate 
influence and 
adequate 
remuneration policies 
Adequate internal 
control mechanisms 
EBA/ESMA: Senior 
personnel named 
individually 
responsible for 
oversight of 
benchmark 
submissions 
Staff in benchmark 
submissions to have 
adequate skills, 
knowledge and 
expertise and 
compliance training 
Effective whistle-
blowing or internal 
reporting policies 
EBA/ESMA: Occasional 
external audits of 
submissions and 
procedures 
Record keeping for at 
least 5 years of  
-procedures and 
methodologies 
-names of individuals 
responsible for 
submissions and 
oversight 
-communications with 
benchmark 
administrators or other 
third parties 
-substantial exposures 
of individual traders or 
trading desks to 
Benchmark related 
instruments;  
— any transaction 
reversing positions 
subsequent to a 
submission;  
— findings of external 
or internal audits 
related to Benchmark 
submission, remedial 
actions and progress in 
their implementation 
Note Proposed 
Directive is more 
skeletal and leaves 
details to Commission 
delegated legislation 
Governance principles Management of 
conflicts of interest by 
written policy 
Rigorous detection and 
reporting of suspected 
manipulation and 
collusion 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
Robust procedural 
internal control culture 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
EBA/ESMA: zero-
tolerance policy, 
including disciplinary 
measures, for non-
compliance with 
internal policies 
Duties of benchmark 
submitter 
Ensuring that 
benchmark 
submissions are 
credible and robust 
In a Code that would 
be drawn up by 
benchmark 
administrator 
ESMA/EBA: 
Compliance-based, to 
certify to benchmark 
administrator 
Methodology Effective methodology 
based on objective 
criteria and relevant 
information 
Qualitative criteria 
allowed such as expert 
judgment 
Review at least every 
quarter for robustness 
and credibility of 
methodology 
Processes to 
determine input 
eligibility 
Bona fides of input 
important criteria 
Expert judgment can 
be used 
Transaction-based 
verifiable data to be 
used 
Other input or 
qualitative judgment 
can only be used 
subject to internal 
control and guidelines 
eg: EBA/ESMA: with 
senior personnel 
approval 
Accountability Information on 
methodology and use 
of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria to 
be sent regularly to 
benchmark 
administrator 
Notification of 
To benchmark 
administrator based on 
Code of Conduct 
Unclear as to where 
notification of 
suspicious activity goes 
To benchmark 
administrator based on 
Code of Conduct, 
Proposed Directive: 
Code to be approved 
by regulator for critical 
benchmarks 
ESMA/EBA: To respond 
suspected 
manipulation or 
collusion to FCA 
Independent auditor 
for yearly report on 
compliance to be sent 
to FCA 
to regulator if 
regulator makes 
queries directed at 
submitter 
Relations with 
regulator 
Unclear whether FCA 
has direct enforcement 
powers and in what 
form 
Unclear whether FCA 
has powers to directly 
investigate and call up 
documents but this 
may be subsumed 
within general powers 
FCA has under the 
Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 
Unclear if there are 
any direct relations 
ESMA/EBA: To respond 
to reasonable queries 
from regulator 
 
